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Abstract
Like any other logical theory, action theories in reason-
ing about actions may evolve, and thus need revision
methods to adequately accommodate new information
about the behavior of actions. Here we give a semantics
that complies with minimal change for revising action
theories stated in a version of PDL. We give algorithms
that are proven correct w.r.t. the semantics for those the-
ories that are modular.
Introduction
In logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions, theo-
ries are collections of statements of the form: “if context,
then effect after every execution of action” (effect laws);
and “if precondition, then action executable” (executabil-
ity laws). For example, in Propositional Dynamic Logic
(PDL) (Harel, Tiuryn, and Kozen 2000), one could have the
law (¬p1∧¬p2)→ [a]p1, saying that in every context where
¬p1∧¬p2 is the case, after every execution of action a we get
the effect p1; and (p1 ∨ ¬p2)→ 〈a〉⊤, stating that p1 ∨ ¬p2
is a sufficient condition for a’s executability.
These are examples of what we call action laws, as they
specify the behavior of the actions of a given domain. Be-
sides that we can also have laws mentioning no action at
all (static laws). They characterize the underlying structure
of the world, i.e., its possible states. For instance, having
p1 → p2 as a static law would mean p1 ∧¬p2 is a forbidden
state. Action theories will then be collections of laws, each
of them seen as a global axiom in PDL.
Well, it may happen that such descriptions have to be re-
vised due e.g. to new incoming information about the be-
havior of the world. In our example, we may learn that the
only valid states are those satisfying p1 ∧ p2, or that action a
has always ¬p2 as outcome in ¬p2-contexts, or even that p1
is enough to guarantee a’s executability. Here we are inter-
ested in this kind of theory change.
The contributions of the present work are as follows:
• What is the semantics of revising an action theory T by a
law Φ? How to get minimal change, i.e., how to keep as
much knowledge about other laws as possible?
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• How to syntactically revise an action theory so that its
result corresponds to the intended semantics?
Here we answer these questions.
Logical Preliminaries
Action Theories in Dynamic Logic
Our base formalism is PDL without the ∗ operator. Let
Act = {a1, a2, . . .} be the set of atomic actions of a do-
main. To each a there is associated a modal operator [a]. We
suppose our multimodal logic is independently axiomatized,
i.e., the logic is a fusion and there is no interaction between
the modal operators (Kracht and Wolter 1991).
Prop = {p1, p2, . . .} denotes the set of all propositional
constants or atoms. The set of literals is Lit = {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . .},
where each ℓi is either p or ¬p, for some p ∈ Prop. In case
ℓ = ¬p, we identify ¬ℓ with p. By |ℓ| we will denote the
atom in literal ℓ.
By ϕ, ψ, . . . we denote Boolean formulas, examples of
which are p1 → p2 and ¬p1 ⊕ p2. Fml is the set of all
Boolean formulas. A propositional valuation v is a maxi-
mally consistent set of literals. We denote v  ϕ the fact
that v satisfies ϕ. val(ϕ) is the set of all valuations satisfy-
ing ϕ. |=
CPL
denotes the classical consequence relation.
With IP(ϕ) we denote the set of prime implicants (Quine
1952) of ϕ. By π we denote a prime implicant, and atm(π)
is the set of atoms occurring in π. For given ℓ and π, ℓ ∈ π
abbreviates ‘ℓ is a literal of π’.
We denote complex formulas (with modal operators) by
Φ, Ψ, . . . 〈a〉 is the dual operator of [a], (〈a〉Φ =def ¬[a]¬Φ).
An example of a complex formula is (p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ ¬p3)) →
[a](¬p1 ∨ p3).
A PDL-model is a tuple M = 〈W,R〉 where W is a set
of valuations, and R maps action constants a to accessibility
relations Ra ⊆ W×W. Given a model M , |=
M
w
p (p is true at
worldw of model M ) if w  p; |=M
w
[a]Φ if |=M
w′
Φ for everyw′
s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Ra; truth conditions for the other connectives
are as usual. By M we will denote a set of PDL-models.
M is a model of Φ (noted |=MΦ) if and only if |=M
w
Φ for all
w ∈ W. M is a model of a set of formulas Σ (noted |=M Σ)
if and only if |=MΦ for every Φ ∈ Σ. Φ is a consequence of
the global axioms Σ in all PDL-models (noted Σ |=
PDL
Φ) if
and only if for every M , if |=MΣ, then |=MΦ.
With PDL we can state laws describing the behavior of
actions. Following the tradition in the reasoning about ac-
tions community, we here distinguish three types of them.
Static Laws A static law is a formula ϕ ∈ Fml. It charac-
terizes the possible states of the world. The set of all static
laws of a domain is denoted by S .
Effect Laws An effect law for a is of the form ϕ → [a]ψ,
where ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml. Effect laws relate an action to its effects,
which can be conditional. The consequent ψ is the effect
which always obtains when a is executed in a state where
the antecedent ϕ holds. If a is a nondeterministic action,
then ψ is typically a disjunction. If ψ is inconsistent we have
a special kind of effect law that we call an inexecutability
law. For example, (¬p1 ∧ p2)→ [a]⊥ says that a cannot be
executed (there is no a-transition) in ¬p1 ∧ p2-contexts. The
set of effect laws of a domain is denoted by E .
Executability Laws An executability law for a has the form
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, with ϕ ∈ Fml. It stipulates the context in which
a is guaranteed to be executable. (In PDL, the operator 〈a〉 is
used to express executability, 〈a〉⊤ thus reads “a’s execution
is possible”.) The set of all executability laws of a domain
is denoted by X .
Action Theories T = S ∪ E ∪ X is an action theory.
Given an action a, Ea (resp. Xa) will denote the set of
only those effect (resp. executability) laws about a. For the
sake of clarity, we here abstract from the frame and rami-
fication problems, and assume T contains all frame axioms
(cf. (Herzig, Perrussel, and Varzinczak 2006) for a contrac-
tion approach within a solution to the frame problem).
Elementary Atoms and Prime Valuations
Given ϕ ∈ Fml, E(ϕ) denotes the elementary atoms actu-
ally occurring in ϕ. For example, E(¬p1 ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p2)) =
{p1, p2}. An atom p is essential to ϕ if and only if p ∈ E(ϕ′)
for every ϕ′ such that |=
CPL
ϕ ↔ ϕ′. For instance, p1 is es-
sential to ¬p1 ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p2). E!(ϕ) will denote the essential
atoms of ϕ. (If ϕ is not contingent, i.e., it is a tautology or a
contradiction, then E!(ϕ) = ∅.)
For ϕ ∈ Fml, ϕ∗ is the set of all ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that
ϕ |=
CPL
ϕ′ and E(ϕ′) ⊆ E!(ϕ). For instance, p1 ∨ p2 /∈ p1∗,
as p1 |=CPL p1 ∨ p2 but E(p1 ∨ p2) 6⊆ E!(p1). Moreover
E(ϕ∗) = E!(ϕ∗), and whenever |=
CPL
ϕ ↔ ϕ′, E!(ϕ) =
E!(ϕ′) and also ϕ∗ = ϕ′∗.
Theorem 1 (Least atom-set theorem (Parikh 1999))
|=
CPL
ϕ ↔
∧
ϕ∗, and E(ϕ∗) ⊆ E(ϕ′) for every ϕ′ s.t.
|=
CPL
ϕ↔ ϕ′.
Thus for each ϕ ∈ Fml there is a unique least set of elemen-
tary atoms such that ϕ may equivalently be expressed using
only atoms from that set.1
1The dual notion (redundant atoms) is addressed in (Herzig and
Rifi 1999), with similar purposes.
Given a valuation v, v′ ⊆ v is a subvaluation. For W a set
of valuations, a subvaluation v′ satisfies ϕ ∈ Fml modulo W
(noted v′ W ϕ) if and only if v  ϕ for all v ∈ W such that
v′ ⊆ v. A subvaluation v essentially satisfies ϕ (modulo W),
noted v !
W
ϕ, if and only if v W ϕ and {|ℓ| : ℓ ∈ v} ⊆
E!(ϕ). If v !
W
ϕ, we call v an essential subvaluation of ϕ
(modulo W).
Definition 1 Let ϕ ∈ Fml and W be a set of valuations. v is
a prime subvaluation of ϕ (modulo W) if and only if v !
W
ϕ
and there is no v′ ⊆ v s.t. v′ !
W
ϕ.
Prime subvaluations of a formula ϕ are the weakest states
of truth in which ϕ is true. They are just another way of
seeing prime implicants of ϕ. By base(ϕ,W) we denote the
set of all prime subvaluations of ϕ modulo W.
Theorem 2 Let ϕ ∈ Fml and W be a set of valuations. Then
for allw ∈ W, w  ϕ if and only ifw  ∨v∈base(ϕ,W) ∧ℓ∈v ℓ.
Closeness Between Models
When revising a model, we will perform a change in its
structure. Because there can be several different ways of
modifying a model (not all of them minimal), we need a no-
tion of distance between models to identify those that are
closest to the original one.
As we are going to see in more depth in the sequel, chang-
ing a model amounts to modifying its possible worlds or
its accessibility relation. Hence, the distance between two
PDL-models will depend upon the distance between their
sets of worlds and accessibility relations. These here will be
based on the symmetric difference between sets, defined as
X−˙Y = (X \ Y ) ∪ (Y \X).
Definition 2 Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a model. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉
is as close to M as M ′′ = 〈W′′,R′′〉, noted M ′ M M ′′,
if and only if
• either W−˙W′ ⊆ W−˙W′′
• or W−˙W′ = W−˙W′′ and R−˙R′ ⊆ R−˙R′′
(Notice that other distance notions are also possible, like
e.g. considering the cardinality of symmetric differences.)
Semantics of Revision
Contrary to action theory contraction (Varzinczak 2008a),
where we want the negation of some law to become satis-
fiable, in revision we want to make a new law valid. This
means that one has to eliminate all cases satisfying its nega-
tion. This depicts the duality between revision and contrac-
tion: whereas in the latter one invalidates a formula by mak-
ing its negation satisfiable, in the former one makes a for-
mula valid by forcing its negation to be unsatisfiable prior to
adding the new law to the theory.
The idea behind our semantics is as follows: we initially
have a set of models M in which a given formula Φ is (po-
tentially) not valid, i.e., Φ is (possibly) not true in every
model in M. In the result we want to have only models of
Φ. Adding Φ-models to M is of no help. Moreover, adding
models makes us to lose laws: the corresponding resulting
theory would be more liberal.
One solution amounts to deleting from M those models
that are not Φ-models. Of course removing only some of
them does not solve the problem, we must delete every such
a model. By doing that, all resulting models will be mod-
els of Φ. (This corresponds to theory expansion, when the
resulting theory is satisfiable.) However, if M contains no
model of Φ, we will end up with ∅. Consequence: the result-
ing theory is inconsistent. (This is the main revision prob-
lem.) In this case the solution is to substitute each model
M in M by its nearest modification M ∗Φ that makes Φ true.
This lets us to keep as close as possible to the original mod-
els we had. But, what if for one model inM there are several
minimal (incomparable) modifications of it validating Φ? In
that case we shall consider all of them. The result will also
be a list of models M∗Φ, all being models of Φ.
Before defining revision of sets of models, we present
what modifications of (individual) models are.
Revising a Model by a Static Law
Consider the model depicted in Figure 1, and suppose we
want to revise it by the Boolean formula p1 ∨ p2, i.e., we
want such a formula to be a static law.
M :
p1,¬p2 ¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
aa
Figure 1: A model where ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 is satisfiable.
In such a model, we do not want the formula ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2
to be satisfiable, so the first step is to remove all worlds in
which it is true. The second step is to guarantee that all
the remaining worlds satisfy the new law. Such an issue
has been largely addressed in the literature on propositional
belief base revision and update (Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Winslett
1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992; Herzig and Rifi 1999).
Here we can achieve that with a semantics similar to that
of classical operators: basically one shall change the set of
possible valuations, by removing or adding worlds.
The delicate point in removing worlds is that we may
lose some executability laws: in the example, removing
{¬p1,¬p2} also removes p2 → 〈a〉⊤. From a semantic
point of view, this is intuitive: if the state of the world to
which we could move is no longer possible, then we do not
have a transition to that state anymore. Hence, if that transi-
tion was the only one we had, it is natural to lose it.
Similarly, one could ask what to do with the accessibil-
ity relation if new worlds are added (when expansion is not
possible): shall new arrows leave/arrive at the new world? If
no arrow leaves the new added world, we may lose an exe-
cutability law. If some arrow leaves it, we may lose an effect
law, the same holding if we add an arrow pointing to the new
world. If no arrow arrives at this new world, what about the
intuition? Do we want to have an unreachable state?
All this discussion shows how drastic a change in the
static laws may be: it is a change in the underlying struc-
ture (possible states) of the world! Changing it may have as
consequence the loss of an effect law or an executability law.
The tradition in the reasoning about actions community
says that executability laws are, in general, more difficult
to state than effect laws, and hence are more likely to be
incorrect. By adding no arrow to the resulting model we here
comply with that and postpone correction of executability
laws, if needed (cf. (Herzig, Perrussel, and Varzinczak 2006;
Varzinczak 2008a)).
The semantics for revision of one model by a static law is
as follows:
Definition 3 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M ∗ϕ if
and only if:
• W′ = (W \ val(¬ϕ)) ∪ val(ϕ)
• R′ ⊆ R
Clearly |=M
′
ϕ for each M ′ ∈ M ∗ϕ . The minimal models
resulting from revising a model M by ϕ are those closest to
M w.r.t. M :
Definition 4 revise(M , ϕ) =
⋃
min{M ∗ϕ,M}
Revising a Model by an Effect Law
Let our language now have three atoms and consider the
model M in Figure 2.
M :
p1,¬p2,¬p3 ¬p1, p2, p3
p1, p2,¬p3
a
a
a
Figure 2: A model where p1 ∧ 〈a〉p2 is satisfiable.
(Notice that |=M p2 → p1 ⊕ p3.) Suppose we want to revise
M by p1 → [a]¬p2. This means that we should guarantee
the formula p1∧〈a〉p2 is satisfiable in none of its worlds. To
do that, we have to look at the worlds satisfying it (if any)
and either make p1 false, or make 〈a〉p2 false by removing
a-arrows leading to p2-worlds.
In our example, the worlds {p1,¬p2,¬p3} and
{p1, p2,¬p3} satisfy p1 ∧ 〈a〉p2 and both have to change.
Flipping p1 would do the job but also has as consequence the
loss of a static law: we would violate p2 → p1⊕p3. Here we
think that changing action laws should not have as side effect
a change in the static laws. Given their special status, these
should change only if explicitly required (see above). In this
case, each world satisfying p1 ∧ 〈a〉p2 has to be changed
so that 〈a〉p2 is no longer true in it. In our example, we
should remove the arrows ({p1,¬p2,¬p3}, {¬p1, p2, p3})
and ({p1, p2,¬p3}, {p1, p2,¬p3}).
The semantics of one model revision for the case of a new
effect law is:
Definition 5 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M ∗
ϕ→[a]ψ
if and only if:
• W′ = W
• R′ ⊆ R
• If (w,w′) ∈ R \ R′, then |=M
w
ϕ and |=M
w′
¬ψ
• |=
M
′
ϕ→ [a]ψ
The minimal models resulting from the revision of a
model M by a new effect law are those that are closest to
M w.r.t.M :
Definition 6 Let M be a model and ϕ→ [a]ψ an effect law.
Then revise(M , ϕ→ [a]ψ) =
⋃
min{M ∗ϕ→[a]ψ,M}.
Revising a Model by an Executability Law
Let the model depicted in Figure 3 and suppose we want to
revise it by the new executability law p1 → 〈a〉⊤.
M :
p1, p2
p1,¬p2 ¬p1, p2
¬p1,¬p2
a
a
a
Figure 3: A model where p1 ∧ [a]⊥ is satisfiable.
Observe that ¬(p1 → 〈a〉⊤) is satisfiable in M , hence we
must throw p1∧[a]⊥ away to ensure the new formula is true.
To remove p1∧ [a]⊥ we have to look at all worlds satisfying
it and modify M so that they no longer satisfy the formula.
Given world {p1,¬p2}, we have two options: change the in-
terpretation of p1 or add a new arrow leaving this world. A
question that raises is ‘what choice is more drastic: change a
world or an arrow’? Again, here we think that changing the
world’s content (the valuation) is more drastic, as the exis-
tence of such a world was foreseen by some static law and is
hence assumed to be as it is, unless we have information sup-
porting the contrary (see above). Thus we shall add a new
a-arrow from {p1,¬p2}. Having agreed on that, the issue
now is: to which world should the new arrow point? Four
options show up: point the arrow to {p1, p2}, {¬p1, p2},
{¬p1,¬p2} or {p1,¬p2} itself. The resulting model is such
that the unwanted formula is unsatisfiable and p1 → 〈a〉⊤
holds in all its worlds.
Whereas all these options make the new law true in
the resulting model, not all of them comply with minimal
change. To witness, putting an a-arrow from {p1,¬p2}
to {¬p1,¬p2} or {p1,¬p2} makes us lose the effect law
¬p2 → [a]p2; and pointing it to {¬p1, p2} also deletes from
the model p1 → [a]p1. Note that these laws are preserved
if we point the arrow to {p1, p2}. What would support the
choice for the latter?
When pointing a new arrow leaving a world w we want
to preserve as many effects as we had before doing so. To
achieve this, it is enough to preserve old effects only in w
(because the remaining structure of the model remains un-
changed after adding this new arrow). The operation we
must carry out is to observe what is true in w and in the
candidate target world w′:
• What changes from w to w′ (w′ \ w) must be what is
obliged to do so.
• What does not change fromw to w′ (w∩w′) must be what
is either obliged or allowed to do so.
This means that every change outside what is forced to
change is not an intended one. In our example, when putting
the a-arrow from {p1,¬p2} to {¬p1, p2}, ¬p1 becomes a
possible effect of a. As far as ¬p1 is never caused by a,
there is no justification for having it in a target world of
{p1,¬p2}. Similarly, we want the literals preserved in the
target world to be at most those that either are consequences
of some effect or are usually preserved in that context. Ev-
ery preservation outside those may make us lose some law.
For instance, when putting the new a-arrow from {p1,¬p2}
to {¬p1,¬p2}, ¬p2 is preserved. Because ¬p2 is not a nec-
essary effect of a and is moreover never preserved across a’s
execution (in M ), there is no reason to preserve it in this
new a-transition.
This looks like prime implicants, and that is where prime
subvaluations play their role: the worlds to which the new
arrow shall point are those whose difference w.r.t. the depart-
ing world are literals that are relevant, and whose similarity
w.r.t. it are literals that we know do not change.
Before giving a formal definition for that, we need to con-
sider two important issues: First, when checking satisfac-
tion of these two conditions, looking just at what is true in
the model M we want to modify is not enough. It can be
a model in which a contingent, i.e., not true in all models
formula is true. Hence we shall consider all the models in
M. Second, if a is never executable in w, i.e., Ra(w) = ∅
for every M = 〈W,R〉 ∈ M, then lots of effects for a triv-
ially hold in w, and then not all of them should be taken into
account in deciding what has to be changed or preserved. In
this case, one should instead look at the effects that hold for
those worlds w such that Ra(w) 6= ∅ (because everything
that holds in these worlds also holds trivially in those worlds
with no transition by a).
Definition 7 Let M = 〈W,R〉 be a model, w,w′ ∈ W, M
a set of models such that M ∈ M, and ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ an
executability law. Then w′ is a relevant target world of w
w.r.t. ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ for M in M if and only if:
• |=
M
w
ϕ
• If there is M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M such that R′a(w) 6= ∅:
– for all ℓ ∈ w′ \ w, there is ψ′ ∈ Fml s.t. there is v′ ∈
base(ψ′,W) s.t. v′ ⊆ w′, ℓ ∈ v′, and for every Mi ∈
M, |=
Mi
w
[a]ψ′
– for all ℓ ∈ w ∩ w′, either there is ψ′ ∈ Fml s.t. there
is v′ ∈ base(ψ′,W) s.t. v′ ⊆ w′, ℓ ∈ v′, and for all
Mi ∈M, |=
Mi
w
[a]ψ′; or there is Mi ∈ M s.t. 6|=
Mi
w
[a]¬ℓ
• If R′a(w) = ∅ for every M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈ M:
– for all ℓ ∈ w′ \ w, there is Mi = 〈Wi,Ri〉 ∈ M s.t.
there is u, v ∈ Wi s.t. (u, v) ∈ Ria and ℓ ∈ v \ u
– for all ℓ ∈ w ∩ w′, there is Mi = 〈Wi,Ri〉 ∈ M s.t.
there is u, v ∈ Wi s.t. (u, v) ∈ Ria and ℓ ∈ u ∩ v,
or for all Mi = 〈Wi,Ri〉 ∈ M, if (u, v) ∈ Ria, then
¬ℓ /∈ v \ u
By RelTgt(w,ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤,M ,M) we denote the set of all
relevant target worlds of w w.r.t. ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ for M in M.
The semantics of one model revision by a new executabil-
ity law is given by:
Definition 8 Let M = 〈W,R〉. M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 ∈
M ∗
ϕ→〈a〉⊤ if and only if:
• W′ = W
• R ⊆ R′
• If (w,w′) ∈ R′ \ R, then w′ ∈
RelTgt(w,ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤,M ,M)
• |=
M
′
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
The minimal models resulting from revising a model M
by a new executability law are those closest to M w.r.t.M :
Definition 9 Let M be a model and ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ be
an executability law. Then revise(M , ϕ → 〈a〉⊤) =⋃
min{M ∗
ϕ→〈a〉⊤,M}.
Revising Sets of Models
Now we are ready to define revision of a set of models M
by a new law Φ:
Definition 10 Let M be a set of models and Φ a law. Then
M∗Φ =
{
M\ {M :6|=
M
Φ}, if there is M ∈ M s.t. |=MΦ⋃
M∈M revise(M , Φ), otherwise
Observe that Definition 10 comprises both expansion and
revision: in the first one, simple addition of the new law
gives a satisfiable theory; in the latter a deeper change is
needed to get rid of inconsistency.
Syntactic Operators for Revision
We now turn our attention to the syntactical counterpart of
revision. Suppose we have an action theory T and a lawΦ we
want to revise T with. If T ∪ {Φ} is satisfiable, adding Φ to
T (expansion) will do the job. Otherwise, if T ∪ {Φ} |=
PDL
⊥,
then we have to modify the laws in T to accommodate with
the new incoming law (proper revision). Our endeavor here
is to perform minimal change at the syntactical level. By T∗Φ
we denote the result of revising T with Φ.
Revision by a Static Law
Looking at the semantics of revision by Boolean formulas,
we see that revising an action theory by a new static law
may conflict with the executability laws: some of them may
be lost and thus have to be changed as well. The approach
here is to preserve as many executabilities as we can in the
old possible states. To do that, we look at each possible
valuation that is common to the new S and the old one. Ev-
ery time an executability used to hold in that state and no
inexecutability holds there in the new theory, we make the
action executable in such a context. For those contexts not
allowed by the old S , we make a inexecutable (cf. the se-
mantics). Algorithm 1 deals with that (S ⋆ ϕ denotes the
classical revision of S by ϕ using any standard method from
the literature (Winslett 1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992;
Herzig and Rifi 1999)).
Algorithm 1 Revision by a static law
input: T, ϕ
output: T∗ϕ
if T ∪ {ϕ} 6|=
PDL
⊥ then
T∗ϕ:= T ∪ {ϕ}
else
S ′:= S ⋆ ϕ, E ′:= E , X ′:= ∅
for all π ∈ IP(S ′) do
for all A ⊆ atm(π) do
ϕA:=
V
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
V
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi
if S ′ 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA) → ⊥ then
if S 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA) → ⊥ then
if T |=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤ and S ′, E ′,X 6|=PDL
¬(π ∧ ϕA) then
Xa
′:= {(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈
Xa}
else
E ′:= E ′ ∪ {(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥}
T∗ϕ:= S
′ ∪ E ′ ∪ X ′
Revision by an Effect Law
When revising a theory by a new effect law ϕ → [a]ψ, we
want to eliminate all possible executions of a leading to ¬ψ-
states. To achieve that, we look at all ϕ-contexts and every
time a transition to some ¬ψ-context is not always the case,
i.e., T 6|=
PDL
ϕ → 〈a〉¬ψ, we can safely force [a]ψ for that
context. On the other hand, if in such a context there is al-
ways an execution of a to ¬ψ, then we should strengthen the
executability laws to make room for the new effect in that
context we want to add. Algorithm 2 below does the job.
Revision by an Executability Law
Revising a theory by a new executability law will have as
immediate consequence a change in the set of effect laws:
all those laws preventing the execution of a shall be weak-
ened. Besides that, in order to comply with minimal change,
we shall ensure that in all models of the resulting theory
there will be at most one transition by a from those worlds
in which T precluded a’s execution.
Let Eϕ,⊥a denote a minimum subset of Ea such that
S , Eϕ,⊥a |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥. In the case the theory is modu-
lar (Herzig and Varzinczak 2005) (see further), interpolation
guarantees that this set always exists. Moreover, note that
there can be more than one such a set, in which case we
denote them (Eϕ,⊥a )1, . . . , (Eϕ,⊥a )n. Let
E−a =
⋃
1≤i≤n
(Eϕ,⊥a )i
Algorithm 2 Revision by an effect law
input: T, ϕ→ [a]ψ
output: T∗ϕ→[a]ψ
if T ∪ {ϕ→ [a]ψ} 6|=
PDL
⊥ then
T∗ϕ→[a]ψ:= T ∪ {ϕ→ [a]ψ}
else
T ′:= T
for all π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) do
for all A ⊆ atm(π) do
ϕA:=
V
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
V
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi
if S 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA) → ⊥ then
for all π′ ∈ IP(S ∧ ¬ψ) do
if T ′ |=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉π
′ then
T ′:=
(T ′ \ X ′a) ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA)) → 〈a〉⊤ :
ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X
′
a}
T ′:= T ′ ∪ {(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]ψ}
if T ′ 6|=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥ then
T ′:= T ′∪{(ϕi∧π∧ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤ : ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈
T}
T∗ϕ→[a]ψ:= T
′
The effect laws in E−a will serve as guidelines to get rid of
[a]⊥ in each ϕ-world allowed by the theory: they are the
laws to be weakened to allow for 〈a〉⊤.
The idea behind our algorithm is as follows: to force
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ to be true in all models of the resulting theory,
we visit every possible ϕ-context allowed by it and make the
following operations to ensure 〈a〉⊤ is the case for that con-
text: Given a ϕ-context, if T not always precludes a from
being executed in it, we can safely force 〈a〉⊤ without mod-
ifying other laws. On the other hand, if a is always inexe-
cutable in that context, then we should weaken the laws in
E−a . The first thing we must do is to preserve all old ef-
fects in all other ϕ-worlds. To achieve that we specialize the
above laws to each possible valuation (maximal conjunction
of literals) satisfying ϕ but the actual one. Then, in the cur-
rent ϕ-valuation, we must ensure that action a may have any
effect, i.e., from this ϕ-world we can reach any other pos-
sible world. We achieve that by weakening the consequent
of the laws in E−a to the exclusive disjunction of all possi-
ble contexts in T. Finally, to get minimal change, we must
ensure that all literals in this ϕ-valuation that are not forced
to change are preserved. We do this by stating a conditional
frame axiom of the form (ϕk ∧ ℓ) → [a]ℓ, where ϕk is the
above ϕ-valuation.
Algorithm 3 gives the pseudo-code for that.
Correctness of the Algorithms
Suppose we have two atoms p1 and p2, and only one action
a. Let the action theory T1 = {¬p2, p1 → [a]p2, 〈a〉⊤}.
The only model of T1 is M in Figure 4. Revising such a
model by p1 ∨ p2 gives us the models M ′i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, in
Figure 4. Now, revising T1 by p1∨p2 will give us T1∗p1∨p2 =
{p1 ∧ ¬p2, p1 → [a]p2}. The only model of T1∗p1∨p2 is M
′
1
Algorithm 3 Revision by an executability law
input: T, ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
output: T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤
if T ∪ {ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤} 6|=
PDL
⊥ then
T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤:= T ∪ {ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤}
else
T ′:= T
for all π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) do
for all A ⊆ atm(π) do
ϕA:=
V
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
V
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi
if S 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA) → ⊥ then
if T ′ |=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥ then
T ′:=
(T ′ \ E ′
−
a ) ∪
{(ϕi ∧ ¬(π ∧ ϕA)) → [a]ψi :
ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
′−
a } ∪
{(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA) → [a]
L
pi′∈IP(S )
A′⊆atm(pi′)
(π′ ∧ ϕA′) :
ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
′−
a }
for all L ⊆ Lit do
if S |=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA) →
V
ℓ∈L ℓ then
for all ℓ ∈ L do
if T |=
PDL
ℓ → [a]⊥ or (T 6⊢
PDL
ℓ → [a]¬ℓ
and T |=
PDL
ℓ→ [a]ℓ) then
T ′:= T ′ ∪ {(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ) → [a]ℓ}
T ′:= T ′ ∪ {(π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤}
T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤:= T
′
in Figure 4. This means that the semantic revision produces
models (viz. M ′2 and M ′3 in Figure 4) that are not models of
the revised theories.
M : ¬p1,¬p2
a
M ′1 : p1,¬p2
M ′2 : ¬p1, p2 M
′
3 : p1, p2
Figure 4: The model M of T and the semantic revision of
M by p1 ∨ p2.
The other way round, the algorithms may produce theo-
ries whose models do not result from the semantic revision
of some model of the original theory. As an example, con-
sider T2 = {(p1 ∨ p2)→ [a]⊥, 〈a〉⊤}, whose only model is
M in Figure 4. The revision of M by p1 ∨ p2 is as above.
However T2∗p1∨p2 = {p1 ∨ p2, (p1 ∨ p2) → [a]⊥} has a
model M ′′ = 〈{{p1, p2}, {p1,¬p2}, {¬p1, p2}}, ∅〉 that is
not in M ∗p1∨p2 .
This happens because the possible states are not com-
pletely characterized by the static laws in S . Fortunately
we get the right result by requiring S to be ‘big enough’.
This is connected with the principle of modularity (Herzig
and Varzinczak 2005):
Definition 11 (Modularity (Herzig and Varzinczak 2005))
T is modular if and only if for every ϕ ∈ Fml, if T |=
PDL
ϕ,
then S |=
CPL
ϕ.
Under modularity, revision of models of T by a law Φ
in the semantics produces models of the output of the algo-
rithms T∗Φ:
Theorem 3 Let T be modular and Φ be a law. For all mod-
els M ′, if M ′ ∈ M∗Φ, for some M = {M :|=M T}, then
|=
M
′
T∗Φ.
Also under modularity, models of T∗Φ result from revision
of models of T by Φ:
Theorem 4 Let T be modular and Φ a law. For every M ′,
if |=M
′
T∗Φ, then M ′ ∈ M∗Φ, for some M = {M :|=MT}.
In (Herzig and Varzinczak 2005) algorithms are given to
check whether T satisfies the principle of modularity and
also to make T satisfy it, if that is not the case.
Modular theories have other interesting properties (Herzig
and Varzinczak 2007): for example, consistency amounts to
that of S ; deduction of effect laws does not need the exe-
cutability ones and vice versa; prediction of an effect of a
sequence of actions a1; . . . ; an does not need the effect laws
for actions other than a1, . . . , an. This also applies to plan
validation when deciding whether 〈a1; . . . ; an〉ϕ is the case.
Conclusion and Perspectives
Contrary to classical belief change, the problem of action
theory change has only recently received attention in the
literature, both in action languages (Baral and Lobo 1997;
Eiter et al. 2005) and in dynamic logic (Herzig, Perrussel,
and Varzinczak 2006; Varzinczak 2008a).
Here we have studied what revising action theories by
a law means, both in the semantics and at the syntactical
level. We have defined a semantics based on distances be-
tween models that also captures minimal change w.r.t. the
preservation of effects of actions. With our algorithms and
the correctness results under modularity we have established
the link between the semantics and the syntax, and have also
shown that the modularity notion is fruitful. Since modular-
ity is preserved across revision (see Lemma 1 in the appen-
dices), it has to be ensured only once during the evolution of
the action theory.
Here we presented the case for revision. In (Varzinczak
2008a) we also define the contraction counterpart of ac-
tion theory change. There we show that moreover our con-
structions satisfy all Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulates for
contraction (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992).
Our next step on the subject is to define a general frame-
work in which to revise a theory by any formula of the
language and not only laws. We believe that such a def-
inition will use as basic operations semantic modifications
like those we studied here (addition/removal of arrows and
worlds). Hence our constructions will help us in better un-
derstanding what revision by a general formula means.
Acknowledgements
The author is thankful to Andreas Herzig and Laurent Per-
russel for interesting discussions on the subject of this work.
This work has been partially supported by the government
of the FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL. Grant: CAPES
BEX 1389/01-7.
References
Baral, C., and Lobo, J. 1997. Defeasible specifications in
action theories. In Proc. IJCAI, 1441–1446.
Eiter, T.; Erdem, E.; Fink, M.; and Senko, J. 2005. Updat-
ing action domain descriptions. In Proc. IJCAI, 418–423.
Ga¨rdenfors, P. 1988. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the
Dynamics of Epistemic States. MIT Press.
Harel, D.; Tiuryn, J.; and Kozen, D. 2000. Dynamic Logic.
MIT Press.
Herzig, A., and Rifi, O. 1999. Propositional belief
base update and minimal change. Artificial Intelligence
115(1):107–138.
Herzig, A., and Varzinczak, I. 2005. On the modularity of
theories. In Advances in Modal Logic, volume 5. King’s
College Publications. 93–109.
Herzig, A., and Varzinczak, I. 2007. Metatheory of actions:
beyond consistency. Artificial Intelligence 171:951–984.
Herzig, A.; Perrussel, L.; and Varzinczak, I. 2006. Elabo-
rating domain descriptions. In Proc. ECAI, 397–401.
Katsuno, H., and Mendelzon, A. 1992. On the difference
between updating a knowledge base and revising it. In Be-
lief revision. Cambridge. 183–203.
Kracht, M., and Wolter, F. 1991. Properties of indepen-
dently axiomatizable bimodal logics. J. of Symbolic Logic
56(4):1469–1485.
Parikh, R. 1999. Beliefs, belief revision, and splitting lan-
guages. In Logic, Language and Computation, 266–278.
Quine, W. V. O. 1952. The problem of simplifying truth
functions. American Mathematical Monthly 59:521–531.
Varzinczak, I. 2008a. Action theory contraction and mini-
mal change. To appear in Proc. KR 2008.
Varzinczak, I. 2008b. Action theory revision. Technical
Report IRIT/RT–2008-1–FR, IRIT, Toulouse.
Winslett, M.-A. 1988. Reasoning about action using a
possible models approach. In Proc. AAAI, 89–93.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let Φ be a law, M ′ ∈ M∗Φ, and let T
∗
Φ be the output of our
algorithms on input theory T and law Φ.
If T ∪ {Φ} 6|=
PDL
⊥, then M ′ ∈ M \ {M :6|=MΦ} and M ′
is a model of T∗Φ = T ∪ {Φ}.
Let T ∪ {Φ} |=
PDL
⊥. We analyze each case.
Let Φ be some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 where
W′ = (W\val(¬ϕ))∪val(ϕ) is minimal w.r.t. W and R′ ⊆ R
is maximal w.r.t. R, for some M = 〈W,R〉 ∈ M.
As we have assumed the syntactical classical revision op-
erator ⋆ is sound and complete w.r.t. its semantics and is
moreover minimal, we have |=M
′
S ⋆ ϕ. Because R′ ⊆ R,
|=
M
′
E . Thus it is enough to show that M ′ is a model of the
added laws.
Given (ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA)→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T∗ϕ, for every w ∈ W′, if
|=
M
′
w
ϕi∧π∧ϕA , then w ∈ W (because S 6|=
CPL
(π∧ϕA)→ ⊥).
From w  ϕi and ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa, we have Ra(w) 6= ∅.
Suppose R′a(w) = ∅. As |=
M
′
S ⋆ ϕ ∪ E and R′ is maximal,
every M ′′ = 〈W′′,R′′〉 s.t. |=M
′′
S ⋆ ϕ ∪ E is s.t. R′′a (w) =
∅, and then S ⋆ ϕ ∪ E |=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥. Because
T |=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤, and S 6|=
CPL
(π ∧ ϕA) → ⊥ and
S ⋆ϕ 6|=
CPL
(π∧ϕA)→ ⊥, we get S ⋆ϕ, E ,X |=
PDL
¬(π∧ϕA),
and then (ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤ /∈ T∗ϕ. Hence R′a(w) 6= ∅,
and |=M
′
(ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA)→ 〈a〉⊤.
If (π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥ ∈ T∗ϕ, then S |=CPL (π ∧ ϕA) → ⊥.
Thus, for every w ∈ W′, if |=M
′
w
π ∧ ϕA, R′a(w) = ∅ and the
result follows.
LetΦ now have the formϕ→ [a]ψ, for ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml. Then
M′ = 〈W′,R′〉 for some M = 〈W,R〉 ∈ M s.t. W′ = W
and R′ ⊆ R, where R′ is maximal w.r.t. R.
From W′ = W, |=M
′
S . As R′ ⊆ R, |=M
′
E . Because
S ∪ E ⊆ T∗ϕ→[a]ψ, it suffices to show that M ′ is a model of
the added laws.
By definition, |=M
′
ϕ → [a]ψ, and then |=M
′
(π ∧ ϕA) →
[a]ψ for every π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ).
If (ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ T∗ϕ→[a]ψ, then for every
w ∈ W′, if w  ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA, we have w  ϕi. As w ∈ W,
and ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa, Ra(w) = ∅. If R′a(w) = ∅, then
w′  ¬ψ for every w′ ∈ Ra(w). Thus as far as we added
(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]ψ to T
∗
ϕ→[a]ψ, we must have T
∗
ϕ→[a]ψ |=PDL
(π ∧ ϕA)→ [a]⊥. Hence R′a(w) 6= ∅.
Let (ϕi ∧
∧
T|=
PDL
(π∧ϕA)→〈a〉¬ψ
¬(π ∧ ϕA)) → 〈a〉⊤ ∈
T∗ϕ→[a]ψ. For every w ∈ W′, if |=
M
′
w
ϕi ∧∧
T|=
PDL
(π∧ϕA)→〈a〉¬ψ
¬(π ∧ ϕA), then w  ϕi, and as
w ∈ W and ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa, we have Ra(w) 6= ∅. If
R′a(w) = ∅, because |=
M
′
S ∧ E and R′ is maximal, every
M ′′ = 〈W′′,R′′〉 s.t. |=M
′′
S ∧ E is s.t. R′′a (w) = ∅. Then
S , E |=
PDL
∧
ℓ∈w ℓ→ [a]⊥. But then T |=PDL
∧
ℓ∈w ℓ→ [a]⊥,
and as ϕi → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ Xa, T |=PDL¬(
∧
ℓ∈w ℓ ∧ ϕi), and then
w /∈ W, a contradiction. Hence R′a(w) 6= ∅.
Finally, let Φ be of the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, for some ϕ ∈
Fml. Then M ′ = 〈W′,R′〉 for some M = 〈W,R〉 ∈ M s.t.
W′ = W and R′ = R ∪ Rϕ,⊤a , with
Rϕ,⊤a = {(w,w
′) : w′ ∈ RelTgt(w,ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤,M ,M)}
such that R′ is minimal w.r.t. R.
From W′ = W, |=M
′
S . As R ⊆ R′, |=M
′
X . As far as
S ∪ X ⊆ T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤, it is enough to show that M ′ satisfies
the added laws.
By definition, |=M
′
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, and then |=M
′
(π ∧ ϕA) →
〈a〉⊤ for every π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ).
If (ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA) → [a](ψi ∨
⊕
pi′∈IP(S )
A′⊆atm(pi′)
(π′ ∧ ϕA′)) ∈
T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤, then for every w ∈ W′, if w  ϕi ∧ π ∧ ϕA,
then w  ϕi. Because |=
M
ϕi → [a]ψi, we have |=
M
w′
ψi for all
w′ ∈ W s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Ra, and then |=
M
′
w′
ψi for every w′ ∈ W′
s.t. (w,w′) ∈ R′a \ R
ϕ,⊤
a . Now, given (w,w′) ∈ Rϕ,⊤a , we
have |=M
′
w′
⊕
pi′∈IP(S )
A′⊆atm(pi′)
(π′ ∧ ϕA′), and the result follows.
Let (ϕi ∧
∧
T|=
PDL
(π∧ϕA)→[a]⊥
¬(π ∧ ϕA)) → [a]ψi ∈
T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤. For every w ∈ W′, if |=
M
′
w
ϕi ∧∧
T|=
PDL
(π∧ϕA)→[a]⊥
¬(π∧ϕA), then w  ϕi, and as |=
M
ϕi →
[a]ψi, we have |=
M
w′
ψi for all w′ ∈ W s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Ra. Thus
|=
M
′
w′
ψi for every w′ ∈ W′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ R′a \ Rϕ,⊤a . Now,
if w 6 ϕ, then Rϕ,⊤a = ∅ and the result follows. Other-
wise, if w  ϕ, then T 6|=
PDL
(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥, and then
(ϕi ∧
∧
T|=
PDL
(π∧ϕA)→[a]⊥
¬(π ∧ ϕA)) → [a]ψi has not been
put in T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤, a contradiction.
Let now (π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ) → [a]ℓ ∈ T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤. For every
w ∈ W′, if |=M
′
w
π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ, then |=
M
′
w
ℓ, and then |=M
w
ℓ. From
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ) → [a]ℓ ∈ T
∗
ϕ→〈a〉⊤, we have T |=PDLℓ → [a]⊥
or T 6|=
PDL
ℓ → [a]¬ℓ and T |=
PDL
ℓ → [a]ℓ. In both cases,
|=
M
w′
ℓ for every w′ ∈ Ra(w), and then |=
M
′
w′
ℓ for every w′ s.t.
(w,w′) ∈ R′ \ Rϕ,⊤a . It remains to show that |=
M
′
w′
ℓ for every
w′ ∈ W′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Rϕ,⊤a .
Suppose 6|=M
′
w′
ℓ. Then ¬ℓ ∈ w′ \w. From the construction
of M ′, there is M ′′ = 〈W′′,R′′〉 ∈ M s.t. there is (u, v) ∈
R′′a and¬ℓ ∈ v\u, i.e., |=
M
′′
u
ℓ and |=M
′′
v
¬ℓ. From (u, v) ∈ R′′a ,
we do not have T |=
PDL
ℓ → [a]⊥. From |=M
′′
v
¬ℓ, we do
not have T |=
PDL
ℓ → [a]ℓ. Thus the algorithm has not put
(π ∧ ϕA ∧ ℓ)→ [a]ℓ in T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 1 Let Φ be a law. If T is modular and T∪{Φ} |=
PDL
⊥, then T∗Φ is modular.
Proof: Let Φ be nonclassical. Suppose T∗Φ is not modular.
Then there is ϕ′ ∈ Fml s.t. T∗ϕ |=PDLϕ
′ and S ′ 6|=
CPL
ϕ′, where
S ′ is static laws in T∗Φ. Suppose T 6|=PDLϕ
′
. Then we must
have T∗Φ |=PDL¬ϕ
′ → [a]⊥ and T∗Φ |=PDL¬ϕ
′ → 〈a〉⊤.
Suppose Φ has the form ϕ→ [a]ψ, for ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml. Then
for all ϕ∧¬ϕ′-contexts, as far as T∗Φ |=PDL(ϕ∧¬ϕ
′)→ [a]⊥,
(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ′) → 〈a〉⊤ /∈ T∗Φ. Then T
∗
Φ |=PDLϕ
′ if and only if
S ′ |=
CPL
ϕ′, a contradiction.
Suppose Φ is of the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, for ϕ ∈ Fml. Then
for allϕ∧¬ϕ′-contexts such that T∗Φ |=PDL(ϕ∧¬ϕ
′) → 〈a〉⊤,
T∗Φ |=PDL (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ
′) → [a]⊥ is impossible as far as E−a has
been weakened. Then T∗Φ |=PDLϕ
′ if and only if S ′ |=
CPL
ϕ′, a
contradiction.
Hence we have T |=
PDL
ϕ′. Because Φ is nonclassical,
S ′ = S . Then T |=
PDL
ϕ′ and S 6|=
CPL
ϕ′, and hence T is not
modular.
Let now Φ be some ϕ ∈ Fml. Suppose T∗ϕ is not modular,
i.e., there is ϕ′′ ∈ Fml s.t. T∗ϕ |=PDLϕ
′′ and S ′ = S ⋆ ϕ 6|=
CPL
ϕ′′.
From S ′ 6|=
CPL
ϕ′′, there is v ∈ val(S ′) s.t. v 6 ϕ′′.
If v ∈ val(S), as T is modular, T6|=
PDL
ϕ′′. From this and
T∗ϕ |=PDL ϕ
′′
, we must have T∗ϕ |=PDL ¬ϕ
′′ → [a]⊥ and
T∗ϕ |=PDL ¬ϕ
′′ → 〈a〉⊤. From the latter, we get T |=
PDL
¬ϕ′′ → 〈a〉⊤, and from the first we have T |=
PDL
¬ϕ′′ →
[a]⊥. Putting both results together we get T |=
PDL
ϕ′′. As
S 6|=
CPL
ϕ′′, we have a contradiction.
If v /∈ val(S), then T∗ϕ 6|=PDL ¬ϕ
′′ → 〈a〉⊤, as no ex-
ecutability for context ¬ϕ′′ has been put into T∗ϕ. Hence
T∗ϕ 6|=PDLϕ
′′
, a contradiction.
Lemma 2 If Mbig = 〈Wbig,Rbig〉 is a model of T, then
for every M = 〈W,R〉 such that |=M T there is a mini-
mal (w.r.t. set inclusion) extension R′ ⊆ Rbig \ R such that
M ′ = 〈val(S),R ∪ R′〉 is a model of T.
Proof: See (Varzinczak 2008b).
Lemma 3 Let T be modular, and Φ be a law. Then T |=
PDL
Φ
if and only if every M ′ = 〈val(S),R′〉 such that |=〈W,R〉 T
and R ⊆ R′ is a model of Φ.
Proof:
(⇒): Straightforward, as T |=
PDL
Φ implies |=M Φ for every
M such that |=MT, in particular for those that are extensions
of some model of T.
(⇐): Suppose T 6|=
PDL
Φ. Then there is M = 〈W,R〉 such
that |=MT and 6|=MΦ. As T is modular, the big model Mbig =
〈Wbig,Rbig〉 of T is a model of T. Then by Lemma 2 there
is a minimal extension R′ of R w.r.t. Rbig such that M ′ =
〈val(S),R ∪ R′〉 is a model of T. Because 6|=M Φ, there is
w ∈ W such that 6|=M
w
Φ. If Φ is some ϕ ∈ Fml or an effect
law, any extension M ′ of M is such that 6|=M
′
w
Φ. If Φ is
of the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, then |=M
w
ϕ and Ra(w) = ∅. As
any extension of M is such that (u, v) ∈ R′ if and only if
u ∈ val(S) \W, only worlds other than those in W get a new
leaving arrow. Thus (R ∪ R′)a(w) = ∅, and then 6|=
M
′
w
Φ.
Lemma 4 Let T be modular and Φ a law. If M ′ =
〈val(S ′),R′〉 is a model of T∗Φ, then there is M = {M :|=M
T} s.t. M ′ ∈M∗Φ.
Proof: Let M ′ = 〈val(S ′),R′〉 be such that |=M
′
T∗Φ. If
|=
M
′
T, the result follows. Suppose 6|=M
′
T. We analyze each
case.
Let Φ be of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, for ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml. Let
M = {M : M = 〈val(S ),R〉}. As T is modular, by
Lemmas 2 and 3,M is non-empty and contains only models
of T.
Suppose M ′ is not a minimal model of T∗ϕ→[a]ψ, i.e., there
is M ′′ such that M ′′ M M ′ for some M ∈ M. Then
M ′ and M ′′ differ only in the effect of a in a givenϕ-world,
viz. a π ∧ ϕA-context, for some π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) and ϕA =∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi ∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi such that A ⊆ atm(π).
Because 6|=M
′
(π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉¬ψ, we must have |=
M
′′
(π ∧ ϕA) → 〈a〉¬ψ, and then 6|=
M
′′
ϕ → [a]ψ. Hence M ′ is
minimal w.r.t. M .
When revising by an effect law, S ′ = S . Hence tak-
ing the right R and Rϕ,¬ψa such that M = 〈val(S),R〉
and R′ = R \ Rϕ,¬ψa , for some Rϕ,¬ψa ⊆ {(w,w′) :|=
M
w
ϕ, |=
M
w′
¬ψ and (w,w′) ∈ Ra}, we have M ∈ M and then
M ′ ∈M∗
ϕ→[a]ψ.
Let Φ have the form ϕ → 〈a〉⊤, for ϕ ∈ Fml. Let M =
{M : M = 〈val(S ),R〉}. As T is modular, by Lemmas 2
and 3, M is non-empty and contains only models of T.
Suppose that M ′ is not a minimal model of T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤, i.e.,
there is M ′′ such that |=M
′′
T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤ and M ′′ M M ′ for
some M ∈ M. Then M ′ and M ′′ differ only on the exe-
cutability of a in a given ϕ-world, i.e., a π ∧ ϕA-context, for
some π ∈ IP(S ∧ ϕ) and ϕA =
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi∈A
pi∧
∧
pi∈atm(pi)
pi /∈A
¬pi,
such that A ⊆ atm(π). This means M ′′ has no arrow leav-
ing this π ∧ ϕA-world. Then |=
M
′′
(π ∧ ϕA) → [a]⊥, and
hence 6|=M
′′
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. Hence M ′ is a minimal model of
T∗ϕ→〈a〉⊤ w.r.t. M .
When revising by executability laws, S ′ = S . Thus
taking the right R and a minimal Rϕ,⊤a such that M =
〈val(S ),R〉 and R′ = R ∪ Rϕ,⊤a , for some Rϕ,⊤a ⊆
{(w,w′) :|=
M
w
ϕ and w′ ∈ RelTgt(w,ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤,M ,M)},
we get M ∈ M and then M ′ ∈M∗
ϕ→〈a〉⊤.
Finally, let Φ be some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then M ′ is such that
for every w ∈ W′, if R′a(w) 6= ∅, then w ∈ val(S) and
Ra(w) 6= ∅ for every M = 〈W,R〉 ∈ M. Choosing the
right M ∈ M the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4
Let T∗Φ be the output of our algorithms on input theory T
and law Φ. If T∗Φ = T∪{Φ}, then T∪{Φ} 6|=PDL⊥, and hence
every M ′ such that |=M
′
T∗Φ is such that M ′ ∈M\{M :6|=
M
Φ} and the result follows.
Suppose T ∪ {Φ} |=
PDL
⊥. From the hypothesis that T
is modular and Lemma 1, T ′ is modular. Then M ′ =
〈val(S ′),R〉 is a model of T ′, by Lemma 2. From this and
Lemma 3 the result follows.
